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The European Union v.
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Estonia's Conflicting Interests as a Party
to the International Criminal Court
By BARBI APPELQUIST*
Introduction
Estonia, the United States and all current members of the
European Union have signed the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights.' This body of public international law protects the
following human rights of alleged criminals: "the protection against
arbitrary arrest, detention, or invasions of privacy; a presumption of
innocence; and a promise of 'full equality' at a fair, public trial, before
a neutral arbiter, with 'all the guarantees necessary' for the defense."2
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created to provide a fair
trial for those accused of certain particularly serious crimes in an
objective international setting.3
Estonia became a party to the ICC when its President signed the
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004. The
author would like to thank the following individuals for their guidance during the
writing and publication of this note: Professor Ugo Mattei; Professor Peter Juviler;
Professor Jenik Radon; Linda Grant Williams, Esq.; Gregory Katz, Esq.; and the
entire 2003-2004 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review staff.
1. Diane M. Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 824 (2000) (quoting Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, arts. 9-12, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001); LAW IN GREATER EUROPE: TOWARDS A COMMON
LEGAL AREA (Bruno Haller et al. eds., 2000); REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999); THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY (Mauro
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
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Rome Statute on December 28, 1999, and its Parliament ratified the
Rome Statute on December 5, 2001.' The Rome Statute permits a
party's national court to transfer jurisdiction to the ICC when a
citizen from a party to the ICC commits a crime against humanity,
genocide, war crime or the crime of aggression
After gaining independence in 1988, Estonia began to compete
economically with the European Union (EU) and established a
military.6 By July 1997, Estonia had developed a stable free-market
economy and was the first Baltic state invited to begin negotiations
for EU membership.7 Five years later, at the Prague Summit in
November 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
extended Estonia an invitation to join its military alliance.8 However,
"[Estonia's] hopes of joining both N[ATO] and the EU appear to be
threatened by the row about the new International Criminal Court in
the Hague."9
Estonia is a relative newcomer to both the EU and NATO,
having only begun negotiating for entry into these multinational
organizations within the last decade. The United States, meanwhile,
has been a leader in the United Nations and NATO since their
inception. The United States is concerned about "the 'unique'
political vulnerabilities that accompany the military role of the
[United States] in ensuring international stability."1 As a result, the
4. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Estonia, at
<www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/europecis/estonia.html> (visited Mar. 3, 2003)
[hereinafter CICC, Estonia].
5. Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE To IMPUNITY 75, 94 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe
Nesi eds., 2001).
6. Julius Strauss, Changing Estonia Greets NATO with Quiet Sense of Triumph,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 23, 2002, at 23.
7. For historical analysis of relations between the EU and Estonia, see
Commission of the European Communities 2002 Regular Report on Estonia's
Progress Towards Accession, SEC(2002) 1402 (Oct. 9, 2002), at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/index.htm> [hereinafter
Commission of the European Communities]; Strauss, supra note 6 ("Estonia has
made huge progress in its 11 years of independence. It has a budding high-
technology industries.").
8. NATO, Prague Summit: The Road to NATO Membership, at
<www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/more-info/membership.htm> (visited
Jan. 7, 2003).
9. Ian Traynor, East Europeans Torn on the Rack by International Court Row,
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 17, 2002, at 16.
10. Sarah B. Sewall et al., The U.S. and the International Criminal Court: An
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United States has requested that parties to the ICC sign
agreements-referred to as Article 98 treaties-exempting U.S.
citizens from ICC jurisdiction." The EU has opposed Article 98
treaties on the grounds that they threaten the legitimacy of the ICC."2
This note evaluates the conflicting political pressure exerted on
Estonia: while the EU is pressuring Estonia not to sign an Article 98
treaty, Estonia is receiving concurrent pressure from the United
States to sign. Part One summarizes the theory of transplantation
and how Estonia's relationships with the EU, NATO and the ICC
have affected Estonia's international legal obligations and diplomatic
options. Part Two analyzes Estonia's relations with the United
States, NATO and the EU. Part Three evaluates the positions of
Estonia, the United States and the EU in relation to the ICC. Part
Four identifies and analyzes U.S. and EU interpretations of Article 98
and concludes with a discussion as to how Estonia could solve its
Article 98 problem.
I. Theory of Legal Transplantation
A. Overview
"[ELvery legal system... contains imported elements. All legal
systems are, to some extent, mixed; no legal system has been
constructed out of purely indigenous materials." 3 For example, laws
can be written into another country's civil or criminal code, or a
country can borrow another's legal education system. This process of
"movement of legal norms or specific laws from one State to another
during the process of lawmaking or legal reform" is formally known
as "legal transplantation."1
Overview, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen
eds., 2000).
11. See generally THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl
Kaysen eds., 2000).
12. Campaign for Global Change, World Federalist Association, EU Message for
the U.S.: Stop Blocking the ICC (Sept. 30, 2002), at
<www.wfa.org/resources/releases.html>. See also Risks for the Integrity of the Statute
of the International Criminal Court, Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1300 (2002) at
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%
2FDocuments%2FAdoptedText%2FtaO2%2FERES1300.htm>.
13. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 13 (6th ed. 1998).
14. Steven J. Hein, Note, Predicting Legal Transplants: The Case of Servitudes in
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A country may borrow components of a legal system from
another in a largely voluntary fashion. For example, Turkey adopted
the Swiss Civil Code of its own volition. 5 Alternatively, a state may
be required to adopt aspects of foreign law because of conquest,
colonization or military or political pressure. 16 Estonia's use of
foreign legal systems and public international law is an example of
transplantation both by voluntary admiration and by involuntary
inducement: to join the EU and NATO, Estonia must enact specific
legislation written by and for these powerful multilateral
organizations. 7
When Estonia translated and enacted the European Acquis,
Estonian legislators "resorted to the wholesale importation of foreign
law.' 8  As a country reasserting its independence after Soviet
occupation, Estonia resembled a developing country in many ways.
As such, Estonia, like many developing countries, relied "not only on
foreign models but also on foreign personnel for the preparation,
drafting and educational and administrative implementation of their
new laws."19 Estonia needed to quickly adopt a democratic form of
government, enact legislation that would stimulate and regulate the
the Russian Federation, 6 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 187, 189 (1996) (footnotes
omitted). For an introduction to and overview of legal transplants, see ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed.
1993).
15. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 13, at 12.
16. Id.
17. See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and by Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia
and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 107 (1995) (providing discussion of the
necessity for Central and Eastern European states to borrow from Western legal
models: "Transformation of the whole economic system requires the repeal of a huge
body of pre-existing legislation mainly in the administrative field, but also in the area
of economic law.... To avoid inconsistency in the adoption of the rules, a
comprehensive modem codification of civil law seems to be the best tool to prevent
chaos and provide the technical guarantees for the further development of both civil
and commercial legislation. In this respect a Code is the necessary complement to
political guarantees embodied in a new Constitution and in International agreements.
Therefore, far from being a simple legislative act, a Civil Code can also be considered
as a depository of the fundamental rules for the new economic freedoms and
commercial relations.").
18. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 13, at 11 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 12. ("In some respects, the current scramble to influence legal
developments in former 'socialist' countries might be regarded as a new third wave of
'legal imperialism."' In 1997, this activism included EU diplomats in Estonia's Office
of European Integration to help write EU legislation into Estonian law and to ensure
passage via the Riigigoku, Estonia's Parliament.).
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economy and support a military worthy of contributing to NATO. 0
Estonia accomplished these goals through the use of legal transplants,
borrowing laws from the EU and NATO to develop and sustain its
new democratic civil law system.2
Pursuant to Estonia's Association Agreement with the EU,
Estonia adopted the Acquis and other European Community trade
mechanisms.22 "The [EU] and initiatives in uniforming legislation
have inspired a rethinking of rules and concepts, while business
practice has invented solutions common to all legal systems."23 This
"rethinking" helped Estonia to become a stable free-market
economy." For example, Estonia was required under the Association
Agreement to adapt relevant positive law and collateral technical
regulations.25 Estonia also had preexisting duties to enact and enforce
antitrust legislation based on the EU model.26 Estonia has rapidly
adopted this legislation in the form of amended pre-Soviet
commercial codes.27  This amended legislation, based on EU
legislation and required for EU accession, is viewed by Estonians and
citizens of other post-Soviet states "as a prerequisite for the creation
of a free market."8
Also, as a successful applicant to and future member of NATO,
Estonia adopted military procedures in line with U.S. and NATO
systems." Estonia has also adopted NATO-based legislation.3" "The
draft of the new comprehensive International Military Co-operation
Act... develops further the existing legal framework for fulfilling
Estonian international military obligations, taking into account the
20. Estonian Institute, Estonica, Transformations in the Estonian Economy, at
<www.estonica.org/eng/> (visited Feb. 2, 2003).
21. See generally Alan Watson, Legal Change.- Sources of Law & Legal Culture,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1983) [hereinafter Watson, Legal Change].
22. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 7.
23. Ajani, supra note 17, at 95.
24. Estonian Institute, supra note 20.
25. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 7.
26. Ajani, supra note 17, at 114.
27. Id. at 108.
28. Id. at 103.
29. Dep't of Defense, Memorandum for Correspondents (July 10, 1997), at
<www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1997/m07101997ml13-97.html> (describing Baltic
Challenge exercises).
30. Annual National Programme 2002/2003 Executive Summary, Republic of
Estonia, Ministry of Defense, Estonia and NA TO, at
<www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=216> (visited Nov. 23,2003).
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prospective NATO membership."31 By adopting the requisite NATO
components, Estonia's legal framework will contain Anglo-American
transplants as well.
B. Problems with the Theory of Transplantation
Although the transplantation of the EU Acquis and NATO
legislation is required for Estonia's membership in these
organizations, it creates an internal loyalty conflict. Which area of
law is more intrinsic to the Estonian culture? Is either multinational
body a closer cultural fit for Estonia? These questions highlight the
basic problems with the theory of legal transplantation.
The major problem with applying this theory to Estonia's real-
world situation is that the theory assumes a perfect relationship
between law and culture." It assumes the receiving system-here
Estonia-to be identical to the sending systems (the EU or United
States), and the EU and NATO assume that Estonia will receive the
legal language without conflict. The efforts to improve the Estonian
legal system are created by a "rather awkward mixture of goodwill,
optimism, self-interest, arrogance, ethnocentricity, and a simple lack
of understanding."33  These challenges are evident in the conflict
Estonia faces as a current member to the ICC and as an aspiring
member of the EU and NATO. For example, the linguistic challenge
to translate the "new" English-language laws into Estonian
sometimes requires the invention of new Estonian words."
An additional issue common with legal transplants is the
"unrealistic desire to accomplish too much": organizations attempt to
transplant foreign law to a local system both to improve that
31. Id.
32. See generally Philip Nichols, The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani
Reception of a Transplanted Foreign Investment Code, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
1235, 1235-46 (1997).
33. Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human
Rights & the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1335,
1382-83 (1999) (quoting JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN
LAWYERS & FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 14 (1980) (characterizing the
American lawyers sent abroad as micro-level problem solvers to macro-level social
engineers)).
34. During the summer of 1997, the author of this Note personally observed
representatives from the Office of European Integration located in the Parliament of
Estonia searching through English, French, German and Estonian dictionaries to
properly determine language that was being written into Estonian law in preparation
for EU accession.
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particular legal issue and to improve the larger civil society.35 "While
commercial legal transplants may find fertile ground for local
adaptation, the civil society rule of law projects are likely to miss their
mark."36 Estonia's need to quickly transform itself into a free-market
economy may have sidestepped the country's legitimate concerns
about "rule of law." Local custom must now give way to EU-
prescribed methods.
C. Types of Legal Transplants
In general, there are two major types of legal transplants:
voluntary and involuntary.37 A "transplant bias" in favor of a
particular sending system (the United States or EU) may lead the
receiving country (Estonia) to implement the sending country's rule
of law.38 This voluntary transplant may result in the least appropriate
rule, because of a receiving state's bias.3 9
Often the foreign rules are borrowed without investigation into
whether the rules are the best possible or even appropriate. The
main causes of this transplant bias are ... the general high standing
of the donor system; the general high prestige, apart from its law, of
the donor state; a shared legal tradition of the donor and borrower;
and the accessibility-for instance, in writing or in a code-of the
law to be borrowed.40
This bias is of particular concern for Estonia because "[t]he fall
of Soviet-dominated States in the late 1980s and early 1990s has
ushered in a new wave of legal transplants. 4 1 These legal transplants
have come predominantly from the United States, Germany and the
EU.
Estonia may be considered to have voluntarily transplanted the
EU Acquis and NATO legislation if the perception is that Estonia
35. Mertus, supra note 33, at 1383.
36. Id.
37. See generally WATSON, supra note 14, at 21-30.
38. Watson, Legal Change, supra note 21, at 1146 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 1146-47 ("Although a totally inappropriate rule is very unlikely to be
voluntarily borrowed, it often happens, and at least in the past, usually did, that the
borrowing system does not systematically search for the best rule from elsewhere, but
consistently looks to the one system, which at times will not have the most
appropriate rule.").
40. Id. at 1147.
41. Mertus, supra note 33, at 1382 (footnote omitted). See also Ajani, supra note
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"voluntarily accept[ed] a large part of the system of" the EU, the
United States and Germany. 2 However, Estonia has not adopted
aspects of these legal systems entirely of its own free will; exercise of
control by both the EU and NATO suggest transplantation
simultaneously by coercion as well. 3  The legislation has been
adopted in large part because of the "reputation and authority" of the
EU and NATO, and of the nations with the most influence in these
organizations. ' Additionally, "practical economic or social reasons
[may] suggest that the law should be changed.""5  When Estonia
regained its independence and sought regional alliances, "pressure
forces" to change the law existed. 6
Why is this analysis of legal transplantation relevant to Estonia's
challenge of reconciling conflicting pressure from NATO and the
EU? Both the internal conflict-Estonia's recently enacted
legislation-and the external conflict-alliances-will need to be
readdressed when Estonia decides whether or not to sign a bilateral
treaty with the United States to exempt it from ICC jurisdiction.
II. Estonia: Caught in the Middle
A. History47
The Russian Empire occupied Estonia until 1917; Estonia
declared its independence in 1918.48 Four years later, on September
22, 1922, the League of Nations officially recognized Estonia as an
independent state.49 Estonia continued to exist as an independent
nation for approximately eighteen years, until the Soviet Union
occupied it in 1940."o In 1941, Germany attacked the Baltics, and
42. See generally WATSON, supra note 14, at 30.
43. Id. at 89.
44. Id. at 90.
45. Watson, Legal Change, supra note 21, at 1153. For the importance of
"pressure forces" for legal change, see Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal
Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 324-26, 332-33 (1978) [hereinafter, Watson,
Comparative Law].
46. Watson, Comparative Law, supra note 45.
47. For a timeline of the history of Estonia, see Institute of Baltic Studies, Arts &
Humanities, Dates from the History of Estonia, at
<www.ibs.ee/ibs/history/dates.html> (visited Feb. 2, 2003).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Estonia was occupied by German soldiers until the Soviets regained
control in 1944."' The Soviet occupation continued until 1988, when
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. declared Estonia a sovereign
52
state.
In May 1990, Estonia reinstated five articles of its 1939
Constitution and, in 1991, was internationally re-recognized as an
independent state. 3 Estonia began redeveloping its legal system in
1991. "[Tlhe developments of the Republic of Estonia ... are,
without doubt, of great interest as an example of a country in
transformation. 5 4 Estonia was in a position to either adopt the legal
system it had prior to the Soviet occupation or to develop a modern
legal system similar to those of its European neighbors. Estonia
chose a combination of the two, adopting a civil law system based on
the pre-World War II Estonian system with strong influences from
the German legal system.5
The above history details Estonia's dynamic century with
frequent changes of control. Estonia must rely on its alliances with
multilateral organizations in order to maintain sovereign
independence. Once Estonia gains full membership into NATO and
the EU, Estonia's "economic and political future" will be ensured. 6
B. Estonia's Relations with the United States and NATO
The United States has supported Estonia since Estonia's first
declaration of independence in the early twentieth century. 7 The
United States was also one of the first nations to recognize Estonia's
reassertion of independence after Soviet occupation.58 Since this
time, the United States has continually assisted Estonia with direct
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Baltic States: Independence of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, in 37 KEESING'S
REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 38419 (Roger East ed., 1991).
54. Peeter Jarvelaid, Estonian Legal Culture on the Threshold to the 21st Century,
29 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 75, 76 (2001).
55. For a list of Estonian legislation to date, see Tartu University, An Overview
of Estonian Law and Web Resources, available at
<www.llrx.com/features/estonianl.htm> (visited Feb. 2,2003).
56. Strauss, supra note 6.
57. Jarvelaid, supra note 54, at 75 ("On July 28, 1922, the Republic of Estonia
was de jure recognized by the United States.").
58. Dep't of State, The Embassy of the United States of America, U.S. Mission to
Estonia, History of the U.S. Relations with Estonia, at <www.usemb.ee/history.php3>
(visited Feb. 5, 2003).
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diplomatic, financial and military support. 9 The United States also
assisted Estonia in strengthening its military capabilities through
NATO. In the financial year ending September 2003, Estonia
received more than three million dollars from the United States in
military aid.6° In addition to financial support, the United States has
also contributed military training: troops were sent to the Baltic
States for the "Baltic Challenge" and "BALTOPS" training exercises,
during which American forces trained Baltic troops to prepare for
NATO peacekeeping missions.6' Also, Estonia is a member of the
State Partnership Program, which serves as a joint experiment by the
Departments of State and Defense to accelerate integration of former
Soviet bloc nations into NATO.62
Since independence, Estonia's relationship with NATO has been
positive, and in 1999, NATO accepted Estonia as a potential
candidate for membership.63 At the Prague Summit on November 21-
22, 2002, NATO formally invited Estonia to be a full member.6 For
many Estonians, Prague provided "a feeling of stability and
security., 65 Estonia completed the second round of negotiations with
NATO on January 6, 2003,' with a focus on financial resources for
admission,67 information protection and legal matters.6' Estonia
59. Dep't of State, The Embassy of the United States of America, Office of
Defense Cooperation: 2002 Assistance, at <www.usemb.ee/odc2002.php3> (visited
Feb. 5, 2003); Estonia-Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Baltic Charter (Jan. 16,
1998), at <www.vm.ee/eng/kat_204//aken-prindi/899.html>.
60. U.S. Decision No Surprise to Estonian Authorities, BALTIC NEWS SERVICE,
July 2, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
61. Baltic Challenge, at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/baltic-
challenge.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 2003); Estonia-Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
ESTONIAN DEFENSE DIGEST (June 1-25, 2003), at
<www.vm.ee/eng/nato/aken-prindi/3839.html>. Most recently, the United States and
NATO participated in BALTOPS from June 9-20, 2003.
62. Dep't of State, U.S. European Command, State Partnership Program, State
Partnership Stockholders Report (Sept. 2000), at
<www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/
ECPA/main.htm&2>.
63. Estonia and Six Other Countries Receive Invitations to NATO, BALTIC NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 21, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
64. NATO, supra note 8.
65. Press Article Lauds NATO for Improving Estonia's Image, BBC
MONITORING FORMER SOVIET UNION-POLITICAL, Nov. 22, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
66. Estonia Completes Second Round of NATO Admission Talks, INTERFAX
NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 17, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
67. Id. ("Estonia confirmed it will spend 2% of its GDP on defense.").
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expected NATO membership negotiations to be finished by March
2003.69
However, Estonia is not yet a full member of NATO. In order
for Estonia to become a full member, it must sign the accession
protocol, and NATO member countries must "ratify, accept or
approve the protocols, according to their national requirements and
procedures." 7
Estonia must develop and maintain appropriate military
capabilities and complete the requisite legal reform designated by
NATO.7" Estonia has completed all necessary reforms pursuant to
the Annual National Plan and continues to make reforms in
preparation for NATO membership.72 The reform plan is a technical
supplement that includes the necessary reforms for the Defense
Forces (e.g., resolving mobilization-related problems) as well as the
resolution of legal, political, and economic issues (e.g., law on the
organization of the defense forces).73 Estonia must complete the
reform plan in order to become a full member of NATO.7" Once the
reform plan is completed, all current NATO member states must
formally ratify the accession protocol to guarantee Estonia's inclusion
in NATO.75
Estonia's admission to NATO depends upon the consent of the
U.S. Senate, because the Senate must ratify the accession protocol.76
68. Id. Estonia will have to sign about ten other international agreements in
order to become a full NATO member.
69. Estonia to Wrap up NATO Talks by March 2003-Head of Delegation,
BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 26, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File.
70. NATO, supra note 8.
71. A Lot of Work Lies Ahead of Estonia on NATO Course-Ambassador to
NATO, BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 21, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
72. Estonia-Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia and NA TO-from Partnership
to Membership, at Chronology of EU-Estonia Relations, at
<www.vm.ee/eng/kat_206/1006.html> (visited Dec. 3, 2003).
73. NATO Invitation Requires Estonia to Amend Several Laws-MP, BALTIC
NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
74. Estonia to Wrap up NA TO Talks by March 2003-Head of Delegation, supra
note 69.
75. Estonia Wishes to Quickly Get Involved in NATO's Work-Foreign Minister,
BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 25, 2002 available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group
File.
76. Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Applies Pressure to Obtain Article 98 Immunity
Agreements, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Oct. 2002 available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
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According to the Senate, a factor for NATO admission will be
Estonia's willingness to sign an Article 98 bilateral treaty and grant
U.S. individuals immunity from the ICC:77 "the measure of support
[for the United States] is the [NATO] candidate country's...
readiness to sign the [Article 98] immunity accord concerning U.S.
soldiers. 7 ' Estonia's anticipated admission into NATO may be
compromised due to the lack of such "readiness to sign."
C. Estonia's Relations with the EU
Estonia values its relationship with the EU for its potential
impact as a stable form of support on political and market
development in Estonia. The EU provides a common identity
Estonia can share with its Western neighbors. As a group of leading
Estonians commented at the conclusion of the EU talks, "Western
and Eastern Europe are.., a single whole continent again."'
Accession into the EU is considered a "firm safeguard of
development of a free society in Estonia and Estonia's continued
existence in the future.,
81
There are three pillars to the EU, as elaborated by the Treaty of
Amsterdam: (1) the European Community as a single market
economy; (2) common foreign and security policy; and (3) police and
judicial cooperation.' Since its independence, Estonia's goal has
been to gain full membership in the EU. Estonia's invitation to begin
negotiations for acceptance into the EU was formally announced in
July 1997." Estonia was the only Baltic state invited to begin the
77. Id.
78. Treatment of Holocaust has Effect on Estonia's NATO Prospects-lives,
BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 13, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File.
79. Honor Mahoney, U.S. Military Aid Stopped in International Court Dispute,
EU OBSERVER (July 2, 2003), available at
<www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=11930&sid=13>.
80. Estonia's Intellectual, Economic Elite Sign Statement Welcoming End of EU
Talks, BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 14, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File (quoting a statement signed by thirty-seven top Estonian intellectuals,
public figures and business leaders).
81. Estonia's Ruutel, Savi, Kallas Recommend to Vote for EU in Referendum,
BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 16, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group
File.
82. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340); see also 37 I.L.M. 56 (1998).
83. Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia and the European Union, Fact
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negotiations on EU enlargement as part of the "First Round" of
enlargement. 4  Since 1997, Estonia has radically transformed its
legislative system in order to become a full member.85 "Estonia is
determined to [finalize] the EU accession negotiations by the end of
2002. At the beginning of 2002, the Estonian Government adopted
the revised National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
(NPAA) 2002-2003, which outlines the strategy and action plans for
EU accession."'8
These plans require the fulfillment of EU accession criteria.
8 7
Estonia has assumed all requisite admission criteria for accession.
As of 1997, Estonia had fulfilled the political criteria.88 As of October
2002, Estonia was considered to have a "functioning market
economy," thus fulfilling the economic criteria for admission to the
EU. ° In December 2002, Estonia accepted the EU's entry terms.9'
Estonia is "expected to sign [an] accession treat[y] by spring of [2003]
and join the [EU] bloc in May 2004."'  Estonia would then sign the
Schengen Accord and become an external border of the EU in 2006. 9'
In order for Estonia to be a full member, Estonia's voters must also
support the accession.9' Estonia fulfilled this condition by holding an
Sheets, Chronology of EU-Estonia Relations, at <http://spunk.vm.ee/euro//english/>
(visited Feb. 5, 2003).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Annual National Programme 2002/2003 Executive Summary, supra note 30.
87. Conmmission of the European Communities, supra note 7.
88. For a list of all accession negotiation areas and a state by state chart of
completion, see European Union, Accession Negotiations, State of Play, at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/> (visited Feb. 2, 2003). For
links to individual analysis of each negotiation area, see also European Union,
Enlargement of the European Union, State of Negotiations: Factsheets, at
<www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement-new/negotiations/default en.htm> (visited Feb.
2, 2003).
89. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 7.
90. Id.
91. Estonia Accepts EU Enlargement Deal, BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 13, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
92. Breffni O'Rourke, 2002 In Review: EU Creates 'New Europe' With Accession
of 10 Countries, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, at
<www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/12/17122002175035.asp> (visited Feb. 2, 2003).
93. Steve Roman, Hopes, Worries Along Estonia's Future EU Frontier with
Russia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 2, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
94. Id.
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accession referendum on September 14, 2003."5 Though support for
the referendum dipped to as low at 48 percent among registered
voters during the summer of 2003, ultimately, the referendum passed
easily, with over two-thirds of the vote. 96
D. Estonia's Concerns
Now that Estonia has received formal invitations to join the EU
and NATO, what are Estonia's main concerns? Estonia prides itself
on being an independent nation that competes with foreign
economies: "[i]t is time to say that the period when the West was
holding our hand is over." 97 But, the "West," represented by the EU
and NATO, can still exert great pressure on Estonia because its main
concerns in the twenty-first century are its economy and military
defense.
First, Estonia is concerned about stabilizing its economy,
especially in light of recent downward trends in the American and
European economies since September 11, 2001.98 Thus, membership
in the EU is even more essential because it will open up more
possibilities for trade and investment.99
Second, and somewhat surprisingly, Estonia is still concerned
about external pressure from Russia.1" In spring 2002, Russia
influenced Kyrgyzstan to deny Estonian soldiers permission to enter
the country and join NATO forces deploying into Afghanistan from a
new U.S. military base on the Kyrgyz-Afghan border.' °' Also, Russia
95. Estonia to Hold Referendum on EU Membership on Sept. 14, BALTIC NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 18, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
96. See Support to EU Accession Declines in Estonia in June, BALTIC NEWS
SERVICE, July 1, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Estonian
National Electoral Committee, EU Referendum: Results, at
<www.vvk.ee/rh03/tulemus/enght.html> (visited Nov. 23, 2003).
97. Press Article Sees 2003 as Watershed for Estonia as It Prepares To Join EU,
BBC MONITORING FORMER SOVIET UNION-POLITICAL, Jan. 3, 2003, available at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting Enn Soosaar).
98. Eesti Pank (Bank of Estonia), Monetary Developments & Policy Survey,
December 2001: Economic Development, at
<www.eestipank.info/pub/en/dokumendid/publikatsioonid/artiklid/> (visited Nov. 23,
2003).
99. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 7.
100. Russian Politician: NATO Forcing Estonia to Cooperation with Russia,
BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 29, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File.
101. Susan B. Glasser, Tensions with Russia Propel Baltic States Toward NATO,
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2002, at A14.
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has not ratified the completely negotiated treaties that legally
delineate the border between Estonia and Russia.'" Although the
government of Estonia regularly reports on the cooperative
relationship between Russia and Estonia, "[the Estonians] don't trust
Russia and [they] never will."1°3 The Estonian people are concerned
about any external pressure that Russia can assert on Estonia. Thus,
Estonia sees its future position as a NATO member as an essential
opportunity to guarantee national security."
Il. The International Criminal Court
A. Overview s
The concept for international adjudication of mass violations of
human rights began in the late nineteenth century with the 1899
Convention for Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes 1 6 The
desire for a formal international court was addressed again after
World War II with the International Military Tribunals in Tokyo and
Nuremberg.' °7 The need for an international forum was not raised
again until the United Nations established the International Criminal
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda." On July 1, 2002, the Rome
Statute came into force and established the ICC.39 The ICC is
fundamentally different than the existing International Court of
Justice (ICJ) because the ICC is the first international forum to
decide cases against individuals."'
102. Id.
103. Strauss, supra note 6 (quoting Darvet Kodar, a twenty-one year old Estonian
student who lives on a farm overlooking the Gulf of Finland).
104. Official Urges Estonia to Pursue Interests in EU, NATO, BBC MONITORING
FORMER SOVIET UNION-POLITICAL, Nov. 28, 2002, at 9, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
105. For an overview of the ICC and its purpose, see Cheryl K. Moralez,
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Will it Work?, 4 DEPAUL INT'L L.J. 135
(2000).
106. See Leila N. Sadat, The Evolution of the ICC: From the Hague to Rome and
Back Again, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl
Kaysen eds., 2000); for a timeline of the creation of the ICC, see Coalition for the
International Criminal Court, Timeline, at <www.iccnow.org/html/timeline.htm>
(visited Feb. 2, 2003).
107. Sadat, supra note 106, at 34.
108. Id. at 38-40.
109. See CICC, Estonia, supra note 4.
110. Bartram S. Brown, The Statute of the ICC: Past, Present, and Future, in THE
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In late 1995, the Preparatory Committee met to begin
negotiations on the technical questions of the ICC, including
identifying and articulating issues of jurisdiction and the definitions of
crimes." ' The Rome Conference, consisting of 162 countries and 137
non-governmental organizations, convened in June 1998 to negotiate
[mainly in English] the final details of the Rome Statute.112  The
resulting Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court consists
of 128 articles that outline who may be subject to jurisdiction
according to the "complementary" jurisdiction principle of the ICC."3
The Rome Statute is structured so that the ICC will be the permanent
forum for prosecution of the "most serious crimes of concern to [the]
international community as a whole," including genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes."4 There is additional jurisdiction
for the crime of aggression, but this has not yet been defined."'
The Rome Statute is fully effective.' 6 Almost 140 countries have
signed the Rome Statute and ninety-two countries have ratified it."'
However, the ICC "is a political pact, an expression of the principles
on which sovereign powers, aware that their nationals might one day
face prosecution, could agree.11 .8 The ICC is completely dependent
on the member states for assistance, accurately reflecting the tension
between supranationalism and state sovereignty."9
B. Estonia and the ICC
Estonia is a full member of the ICC, having signed the Rome
Statute on December 27, 1999, and ratified it on January 31, 2002.2
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 66 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
111. Id. at 61-63.
112. Id.
113. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 68(3),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Brown, supra note 110,
at 66-67.
114. Rome Statute, supra note 113, pmbl.
115. Brown, supra note 110, at 67. Since the crime of aggression is undefined, the
statute recognizes the important role of the United Nations Security Council in
maintaining international peace.
116. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Rome Statute Signature &
Ratification Chart, at <www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html>
(visited Sept. 12, 2003).
117. Id.
118. Amann, supra note 1, at 862 (footnote omitted).
119. Sadat, supra note 106, at 40-41.
120. CICC, Estonia, supra note 4.
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With ratification, Estonia "accept[ed] binding obligations, including
cooperation with the ICC in the investigating and prosecution of
crimes within its jurisdiction."' 21
Estonia has made changes to its constitution in order to have a
strong judicial system with the power to effectively try criminal cases
and, where necessary, to transfer jurisdiction to the ICC.122  With
those amendments in place, Estonia now stands alongside its Western
neighbors in an international organization.
C. The U.S. Unilateral Objection to the ICC
Even in the preparatory stages of the ICC, the United States had
serious objections to the ICC's assertion of universal jurisdiction.'"
Despite heavy involvement by the United States in the creation of the
ICC,12 4 the United States has failed to ratify the Rome Statute."'
Some scholars argue that the United States has taken this stance
following its history of isolationism
'26  and non-intervention.127
Alternatively, the United States' failure to ratify could be due to the
American value system and belief in certain inalienable rights,
including the right to a "fair trial."'" However, the United States is
the only industrialized nation that has refused to ratify the treaty.'
29
The United States stands with some unexpected "allies" in its refusal
121. Brown, supra note 110, at 72.
122. Council of Europe, The Implications for Council of Europe Member States of
the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Progress
Report by Estonia and Appendices, Consult/ICC (2001)12 (July 16, 2001), at
<www.coe.int/T/E/Legal-Affairs/Legal-cooperation/Transnational-criminal-justice/I
nternationalCriminalCourt/Documents/ConsultICC(2001)12E.asp#TopOfPage>.
123. Brown, supra note 110, at 64.
124. Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate,
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of David J Sheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues and Head of the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal
Court) [hereinafter Sheffer Statement].
125. For a historical analysis of United States' refusal to sign the ICC, see
generally THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen
eds., 2000).
126. Amann, supra note 1, at 864.
127. For an example of U.S. non-intervention, see Moralez, supra note 105, at 138-
39.
128. Amann, supra note 1, at 844.
129. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Rome Statute Signature and
Ratification Chart, at <www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html>
(visited Dec. 3, 2003).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
to ratify, including then-Saddam Hussein-controlled Iraq.'3 °
The U.S. government adamantly argues against ICC
international jurisdiction.'3 ' The United States has three concerns: (1)
the ICC will become heavily politicized against U.S. foreign policy;
132
(2) the ICC is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution;33 and (3)
foreign use of U.S. troops to maintain international security subjects
the United States and the ICC to frivolous cases."'
On December 31, 2000,13 President Clinton signed the Rome
Treaty "to maintain [American] influence and credibility by keeping
[the United States] engaged in completing the court."'36  Sixty-five
percent of Americans agreed with the then-President, acknowledging
that "the [United States] is smart enough to use the ICC's many
safeguards to protect 'Americans engaged in global responsibilities'
and to advance our interest in the final organization of the court.,
137
Although it was signed by the Clinton administration, the Senate has
yet to ratify the Rome Statute. Ratification seems very unlikely in
light of the passage of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act
(ASPA), also known pejoratively in international circles as the
"Hague Invasion Act."
1 38
The Republican House and Senate responded to the Democratic
President's signing of the treaty by introducing the ASPA in 2000 and
passing it in 2002.131 In 2002, President Bush signed the ASPA into
law"4 and subsequently rescinded the U.S. signature from the treaty.
The ASPA went into effect on July 1, 2003.' The ASPA authorizes
130. Id.
131. Scheffer Statement, supra note 124.
132. Sewall et al., supra note 10, at 3.
133. Id. at 13-16.
134. Id. at 16-19.
135. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, United States of America, at
<www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/theamericas/unitedstates.html> (visited Sept. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter CICC, United States of America]. See also Rome Statute, supra note 113,
Annex F, 2; Brown, supra note 110, at 78.
136. John Washburn, Editorial, The Case for the International Criminal Court,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 18,2002, at A34.
137. Id,
138. Moralez, supra note 105, at 138-39 n.140.
139. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7432
(2003). For analysis of the signed bill, see Christopher M. Van de Kieft, Note,
Uncertain Risk: The United States Military and the International Criminal Court, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 2325 (2002).
140.CICC, United States of America, supra note 135.
141. See Jeffrey Donovan, World: U.S. Allies Express Disappointment with
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the President to "use all means necessary and proper to bring about
the release of any person... being detained or imprisoned by, on
behalf of, or at the request of the [ICC].' ' 42  The ASPA also
"prohibits all agencies and entities of the [U.S.] Government, or any
state or local government, from cooperating with the ICC in response
to cooperation with ICC requests" to surrender persons to the
141 141
court, provisional arrests, '" and other forms of cooperation.
Raising fears of unconstitutionality on the basis of separation of
powers, the ASPA also prohibits the United States from "providing
military assistance to a state that is a party to the ICC, unless that
state enters into an Article 98 treaty or is a NATO or major non-
NATO ally."'' 1 6 The ASPA thus attempts to invalidate the legitimacy
of the ICC, at least in regards to ICC jurisdiction influence over the
United States.147
Also on July 1, 2003, the United States followed through on its
threat and cut off "military assistance" to any NATO or non-NATO
ally who had not signed an Article 98 treaty.4 4 As a result, Estonia
lost aid that would have been disbursed in September 2003.
Ironically, Lithuania, a neighboring Baltic state, would have used the
anticipated funds to support their troops involved with the U.S.
efforts in Iraq.
49
The United States' main concern about being subject to ICC
jurisdiction centers on the global use of U.S. troops to maintain
international peace and security.' The United States fears that the
ICC will usurp and not "complement and legitimize" its use of
force.' For example, Greek lawyers filed a complaint against Tony
Immunity Policy, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, available at
<www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/O7/O2072003160624.asp> (visited July 21, 2003).
142. Joshua Rozenberg, Will Bush Invade Cambridgeshire?, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(LONDON), Sept. 5, 2002, at 23 (citing ASPA).
143. Rome Statute, supra note 113, art. 89.
144. Id. art. 92.
145. Id. art. 93; Van de Kieft, supra note 139, at 2341.
146. Van de Kieft, supra note 139, at 2343 (footnotes omitted).
147. For American legal scholars' arguments against the ASPA, see Arthur W.
Rovine, Current Development: Memorandum to Congress on the ICC from Current
and Past Presidents of the ASIL, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 967 (2001).
148. Donovan, supra note 141.
149. Id.
150. See Sewall et al., supra note 10, at 3. The United States is very concerned
about U.S. troops deployed in U.N. peacekeeping missions and in policing "rogue"
countries.
151. Id. at 21.
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Blair and other British officials for "crimes against humanity" for
their role in the Iraq war.52  The U.S. concern is rooted in
conservative fears of "frivolous, nuisance accusations" based on the
U.S. position as the "world's remaining superpower."'53 This position
was advanced by David Scheffer and with even greater force by
Senator Jesse Helms, the Republican head of the Foreign Relations
Committee." Additional U.S. government officials are concerned
that the ICC Prosecutor may indict Americans to "demonstrate
fairness" in a fashion similar to the indictment of both Croats and
Serbs by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.155
As an alternative to potentially frivolous, excessive trials, the
United States proposed an amendment to the Rome Statute. '56 The
amendment addressed the following concerns:57 (1) ICC jurisdiction
should be based on state consent and not universal jurisdiction; (2)
"war crimes" should be narrowly defined; and (3) the U.N. Security
Council should have final approval over every ICC prosecution.5
The United States argued that peace should be secured and
maintained pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
But in reality, the United States wanted the freedom to exercise its
veto power as a permanent member to the Security Council to thwart
frivolous claims. No action was taken on the U.S. amendment.'59 If
the amendment had been adopted, the United States could have kept
all U.S. cases outside of ICC jurisdiction.'9
D. The EU's Multilateral Support for the ICC
The EU, comprised of the executive European Commission and
the legislative Council of Europe, has actively supported the ICC. All
current and future members of the EU are required to sign and ratify
152. Kerin Hope & Nikki Tait, Greeks Try to Indict Blair for Iraq War, FINANCIAL
TIMES (LONDON), July 29, 2003, at 8.
153. Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the
Struggle for an ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 85, 91-92 (Sarah B. Sewall
& Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 95.
156. Id. at 92.
157. Brown, supra note 110, at 65 (footnote omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 68-69; Rome Statute, supra note 113, art. 8(1), (2).
160. Weschler, supra note 153, at 92.
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the Rome Statute."' EU governments are bound by constitutional
treaty to refrain from any action that is contrary to the interests, or
which is likely to impact the effectiveness, of the ICC.'62
"The EU must concentrate on establishing a Court that is strong,
effective and able to deal with the gigantic task of trying international
war criminals.', 63 However, the EU is concerned about the continued
U.S. aggression towards the ICC and its possible effects on the
stability of the judicial organization." Thus, the EU posits that the
ICC's sanctity be maintained in order to prevent a replay of the
League of Nations' destruction.
IV. U.S. Immunity from ICC Jurisdiction
A. Rome Statute, Article 98
The current U.S. goal is complete exemption from ICC
jurisdiction. In exercising jurisdiction, the ICC will normally defer to
the state that chooses to institute national legal proceedings."'
Governments that ratify the Rome Statute agree that defendants
accused of one of the enumerated crimes committed within or against
the signatory state will be "brought to justice" by either sending the
defendant to the ICC or by bringing criminal proceedings in the
signatory's criminal courts, as long as ICC oversight is maintained.
166
However, a state's unwillingness or inability to carry out genuine
prosecution triggers the ICC's universal jurisdiction. 167
Article 98 potentially allowed any country to obtain exemption
for its citizens from ICC jurisdiction via a bilateral treaty between an
ICC member state and an ICC non-member state." The bilateral
treaties allow states to establish which states will have priority to
161. Id.
162. See Campaign for Global Change, supra note 12; Universal Justice: EU States
Must Defend the International Criminal Court, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 27,
2002, at 20.
163. Campaign for Global Change, supra note 12.
164. Risks for the Integrity of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra
note 12.
165. Brown, supra note 110, at 74.
166. Kenneth Roth, Law: Fight the Good Fight, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 22,
2002, at 8.
167. Id.
168. Rome Statute, supra note 113, art. 98.
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adjudicate the matter in conflicts among themselves.69 However, if
the United States signs such treaties with all ICC member states,
there is valid concern that the United States may not "respect the
ICC's right to intervene in national prosecutions should [the national
prosecutions] prove to be a charade.' 17' This ultimate oversight is a
major concern to the long-term legitimacy of the ICC.
B. The U.S. Position
In 2001, the United States obtained a one-year exemption from
prosecution by the ICC for U.S. peacekeepers.' Since that time, the
United States has pursued bilateral treaties with all signatories and
parties to the ICC.11
2
As of November 2003, sixty-five countries had signed bilateral
treaties with the United States, including EU applicant countries
Bulgaria and Romania. 71 However, few of these countries have
ratified such agreements. The United States has threatened economic
sanctions in the form of a ban of military aid if Americans are not
excluded from ICC jurisdiction.'74 As noted above, the United States
has already withheld military aid to Estonia because Estonia has not
signed an Article 98 treaty. In the absence of Article 98 treaties, the
United States is enforcing the ASPA.75
C. The EU Position
Originally, the EU agreed that a unified position should be
devised to either approve or oppose United States request for
exemption. 76 Until that position was devised, the EU exerted great
pressure on applicant countries to not sign bilateral treaties.
"Brussels bluntly warned the east Europeans... to heed EU advice
and avoid making concessions individually to the Americans before
169. Kenneth Roth, Resist Washington's Arm-Twisting; International Criminal
Court, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 30, 2002, at 8.
170. Id.
171. CICC, United States of America, supra note 135.
172. Id.
173. See Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court,
Countries With Bilateral Immunity Agreements (Oct. 29, 2003), at
<www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/article98/tableofbias.html>.
174. Uncle Sam Lays Down the Law, ECONOMIST (U.S.), Oct. 5, 2002, available at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
175. See generally Van de Kieft, supra note 139.
176. Council of Europe, supra note 122.
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the EU agree[d] [to] a common position.'
77
The EU maintains considerable leverage as a voting bloc of
countries within the United Nations and now the ICC1'8 The EU is
able to exert influence on global policy, influence that may adversely
affect perceived U.S. interests. Switzerland, a European country that
is not a member to the EU, agrees with the EU position to maintain
"a strong ICC, as strong as possible.' 79 Europe therefore has the
power to influence the result of this debate between the United States
and the ICC.
In August 2002, the European Commission had issued a
statement that "[s]ignatories of the [ICC] who sign bilateral accords
with Washington aimed at exempting U.S. personnel serving abroad
from prosecution are violating the ICC treaty."'0 However, this
executive statement was issued prior to the Council of Europe's
formal statement. 8' In October 2002, the EU agreed that individual
member governments could sign agreements with the United States
giving limited exemption according to three guidelines." First, there
should be no immunity: the signatory country must insist that an
individual who has committed crimes covered by ICC are tried in
U.S. courts.'83 Second, there should be no reciprocity; the United
States cannot grant immunity to an EU signatory country.'8 Third,
there should be a limited scope of immunity: only government
officials and military personnel stationed in a signatory country will
be granted immunity.
8
1
Although this represents a shift towards friendlier relations
between the United States and the EU, the EU stood firm on its basic
tenet, that there can be no complete immunity or exemption for the
heinous crimes defined under the ICC:
177. Traynor, supra note 9.
178. See generally Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-
Member States, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 273 (2000).
179. Swiss Fear EU Guidelines on U.S. May Undermine International Criminal
Court, BBC MONITORING FORMER SOVIET UNION-POLITICAL, Oct. 2, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
180. Judy Dempsey, Bilateral Pacts with U.S. a Violation Says EU International
Criminal Court Findings, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 28, 2002, at 6.
181. Council of Europe, supra note 122.
182. Tracy Sutherland, Uncle Sam Wins Court Exemption, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 2,
2002, at 9.
183. Council of Europe, supra note 122.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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The Assembly [of the Council of Europe] is greatly concerned by
the efforts of some States to undermine the integrity of the ICC
Treaty and especially to conclude bilateral agreements aiming at
exempting their officials, military, and nationals from the
jurisdiction of the ICC." 6
The EU also has plausible arguments that the U.S. concern about
the ICC's exerting excessive jurisdiction is unfounded. First, the
principle of complementary jurisdiction acts as a self-regulator of
excessive court power. "If [the United States] could show that it was
itself dealing with any given complaint in good faith-investigating
and if necessary prosecuting-then those national efforts would
automatically trump the ICC's.' 187 Additionally, the United States
argues that the definitions of crimes are so broad as to plausibly
include many of the U.S. military actions. However, the ICC's
criminal definitions limit what crimes come under the prosecution's
review. Crimes, "when committed as part of a plan or policy or as
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes," are considered war
crimes; a single unintended instance or action will probably not
trigger ICC jurisdiction.
D. Estonia's Available Positions
Estonia's Prime Minister and the former Estonian Ambassador
to Russia agree that Estonia should sign an Article 98 bilateral treaty
with the United States. 9 "The United States has played a very
important role for Estonia... after Estonia regained its
independence."'9 However, officials do recognize Estonia's difficult
position. "Ideally, the country would like to cooperate with both the
EU and the [United States]."' 91
Estonia is recognized as neither a NATO ally nor a non-NATO
ally. Under the initial interpretation of the ASPA, Estonia was not
186. Risks for the Integrity of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra
note 12.
187. Weschler, supra note 153, at 96.
188. Id.
189. Prime Minister Says Estonia Has Moral Duty To Help U.S., BALTIC NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 17, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Ex-
Envoy: Estonia Should Sign Immunity Accord for U.S. Soldiers, BALTIC NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 15, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
190. Prime Minister Says Estonia Has Moral Duty To Help U.S., supra note 189
(quoting Prime Minister Kallas).
191. Ex-Envoy: Estonia Should Sign Immunity Accord for U.S. Soldiers, supra
note 189 (quoting Prime Minister Kallas).
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going to receive related military aid." Estonia responded that the
loss of aid would not result in a "catastrophe for [Estonia].' 93
Lithuania, a neighboring post-Soviet Baltic state, has implied its
intent to follow U.S. policy without formally signing a bilateral treaty.
"[The] Justice Ministry proposes to declare that Lithuania is ready to
take the persons tried by the [ICC] for serving punishment in
Lithuania, but only if the [individuals] are Lithuanian nationals." 9 '
Thus, Lithuania will not transfer its jurisdiction over U.S. citizens to
the ICC. However, even this tacit support of U.S. policy did not
initially save Lithuania from the punitive provisions of the ASPA and
loss of American military aid.9
Romania, also an applicant to the EU and NATO, signed an
Article 98 bilateral treaty with the United States in August 2002.'1 It
was the first European country to do so. Romania has since received
negative reactions from its European neighbors. 97  In contrast,
Slovakia, an applicant to the EU, "sharply opposes [the exemption of]
U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the ICC based on bilateral
agreements."' 98 Slovakia will not sign a bilateral treaty, and thus will
grant the ICC jurisdiction over all individuals, including Americans,
within its territory.
Based on the close relationship between Estonia and the United
States and the power of the American purse over NATO military
expenditures, it is thus most likely that Estonia will either take a
192. U.S. Cuts off Military Aid to Colombia, Six NATO Prospects, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, July 1, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
But see U.S. President Unfreezes Military Assistance Programs to Lithuania, 5 Central
European Countries, BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 23, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File ("United States President George W. Bush has recalled
part of the restrictions on provision of U.S. military assistance ... [as a] sign of
gratitude for the European allies who joined the Americans in the war on terrorism
and supported the invasion to Iraq.").
193. Suspension of U.S. Military Aid No Serious Problem for Estonia-Official,
INTERFAX (July 3, 2003), available at
<www.interfax.com/com?item=Est&pg=0&id=5646523&req=>.
194. Lithuania Readying to Cooperate with International Criminal Court, BALTIC
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 16, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
195. Donovan, supra note 141. But see US President Unfreezes Military Assistance
Programs to Lithuania, supra note 192.
196. Traynor, supra note 9.
197. Id. ("Romania's decision is now seen as a foreign policy blunder, condemned
by Brussels and regretted by Bucharest.").
198. Slovakia: NA TO Official Attacks U.S. over International Criminal Court, Iraq,
BBC MONITORING EUROPE, Sept. 10, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File.
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position similar to that of Lithuania or sign a formal bilateral
agreement with the United States.199 However, if it does sign, Estonia
must recognize that by using its independent nation member status in
the EU and NATO, it may be threatening the long-term effectiveness
and longevity of the ICC.
Conclusion
Estonia is one of many countries seeking NATO and EU
membership. The long-term effects of the legal transplantation by
the Rome Statute and a potential Article 98 Treaty with the United
States will be evident in the enforcement of Estonia's amended
Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure.
The future implications of a United States-Estonia Bilateral
Treaty, as a form of coercive legal transplantation, can only be
understood within the context of Estonia's place in the international
community. Estonia wants the world to recognize its influence as an
independent nation. But, by signing an Article 98 bilateral treaty
with the United States, Estonia may compromise its goals of
international appreciation.
199. Ex-Envoy: Estonia Should Sign Immunity Accord for U.S. Soldiers, supra
note 189.
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